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GUIDELINES FOR ALLEVIATING
LOCAL-EMERGENCY WORK DISRUPTIONS

The disruption of essential services 1 by strikes and lockouts is
one of the most critical problems confronting the United States
today. As metropolitanization makes increasing numbers of
people dependent on the same suppliers of utilities, transportation, and food, the potential harm from a disruption in the
supply of any of these items grows ever more serious. In the last
decade alone, Americans have witnessed the devastating impact
of walkouts by sanitation workers, police officers, and other essential public 2 employees. 3 Less frequent but equally serious have
been disruptions in private industries that supply such basic local
services as fuel and health care. In 1968, for example, a one-week
strike by New York City's fuel deliverymen left several hundred
thousand New Yorkers without heat for as long as three weeks
and forced many schools, businesses, and even hospitals to close. 4
Despite the power of such strikes by private-sector workers to
paralyze entire communities, few writers have considered the
inadequacy of existing legislation to prevent or limit shutdowns in
1

As used in this article, the term "essential services" refers to the provision of all goods
and services, (1) lacking readily available and comparably priced substitutes and (2)
necessary for maintaining public health and safety. Typical essential services include
police and fire protection, sanitation, telephone and other utility services, and provision of
food and water. Public provision of education, however, does not qualify2 In this article, the terms "public" and "public sector" refer to agencies, departments,
and enterprises whose employees are government employees. The words "private" and
"private sector" denote all other organizations and enterprises.
3 Throughout this article, references to "employees," "unions," and "strikes" are used
as a form of shorthand and are not intended to indicate that employees or their organizations are the primary "causes" of labor disputes in the United States. Thus, the terms
"employers" and "lockouts" would be interchangeable with "employees" and "strikes" in
most instances.
4 In addition, the City Board of Health felt obliged to declare a "state of imminent peril"
that lasted through the fourth week following the walkout. See New York Times Index,
1968, at 1055.
For accounts of other serious, private-sector walkouts, see New York Times Index,
1960, at 839 (Pennsylvania Railroad strike); New York Times Index, 1972, at 1853-54
(Long Island Railroad strike); New York Times Index, January 16-3 1, 1973, at 97 (Long
Island Railroad strike); New York Times Index, 1973, at 1312 (New York City private
hospital strike).
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essential private industries. 5 For this reason the present article
focuses primarily on the difficulty of restricting work stoppages in
the private sector.
The first section of this article summarizes the vast differences
between the rights of public and private employees to strike. The
second section focuses on likely obstacles to a governmental suit
to enjoin shutdowns in the broadest segment of American private
industry-the segment in which labor relations are governed by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 The final section of
the article suggests a legislative solution to the problem, fashioned
after existing statutory remedies for limiting certain strikes by
public employees.
I.

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOY COMPARED

The principal reason why local-emergency work disruption in
private industry appears legally unstoppable is the failure of
American labor law to make potential harm from a strike the
primary criterion for determining what shutdowns are enjoinable.
The following section describes how Congress and the courts,
using ownership of the workplace to distinguish prohibited from
permissible shutdowns, has made strikes by government employees far easier to restrict than walkouts by comparable employees
7
in private industry.
A. The Right of Government Employees
to Strike"
In general, the law affords ample means for avoiding and terminating walkouts by government employees. In forty-four states
and the District of Columbia, strikes by public employees are
s The Inoex to Legal Periodicals for the years 1968 to date lists no articles discussing
the legal issues arising from serious private-sector shutdowns having only local or regional
impact. Among the few recent articles on national emergency work stoppages in private
industry are Crossland, Public Interest Labor Disputes: An Economic and Legal Analysis
Beyond the Pale of Title i1 of the Taft-HartleyAct, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 780 (1966); Jones,
Toward a Definition of "National Emergency Dispute," 1971 Wis. L. REV. 700; and
Lewis, Proposals for Change in the Taft-Hartley Emergency Procedures: A Critical
Appraisal, 40 TENN. L. REV. 689 (1973).
6 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
7 See parts A-D infra.
8 Throughout this section, the terms "public employees" and "government employees"
are defined as employees of state and local governments. Federal government employees
are forbidden to strike by 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1970).
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illegal, either by statute9 or by common law.' 0 In all fort3 five of
these jurisdictions, courts may enjoin strikes by governmental
employees and impose penalties for non-compliance with the
court order. In addition, many of these jurisdictions impose various statutory penalties, such as loss of employment"' or limitation
of subsequent pay increases.1 2 In the remaining states, state and
local employees are expressly permitted to strike, albeit under
varying restrictions with regard to exhausting preliminary bargain9 At this writing, the state statutes prohibiting some or all public employees from
striking included the following: ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (1967); ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.40.200 (1962) (police, firefighters, correctional workers, and state mental hospital
employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-475 (1965) (municipal employees); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1312 (Cum. Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1971) (repealed,
Supp. (1974)); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 138-11 (1970) (strikes
barred for duration of labor agreement); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11-2/3, § 702.19 (Supp.
1973) (public transit employees); ch. -,
[1974] Iowa Laws 107 §§ 10, 12 (CCH Lab.
Law Rep.
47,112 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §75-4333(c)(5) (Supp. 1973) (excluding
teachers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 345.130 (1972) (firefighters); LA. REV. STAT. § 23.890
(Supp. 1972) (public transit disputes submitted to binding arbitration); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26 §§964(2)(c)(3), 979-C(2)(c) (Supp. 1974) (public transit employees; state
employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 64B(D) (1974) (Allegheny County employees), art.
77, § 160A(m) (1974) (noncertified teachers in most counties); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 150E, §9A (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202 (1947); MINN. STAT. § 179.64
(1971); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.530 (Supp. 1967) (no right to strike); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-802 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (Supp. 1973) (strikes by local government
employees enjoinable at governor's discretion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:6 (1969)
(all public employees except police and firefighters); id. § 105-B: 11 (1972) (police and
firefighters); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8 (1968) (no right to strike); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-53-16 (1973) (municipal transit employees); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney
1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, § 548.14
(1971) (police and firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-6 (1966); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 3-18-11 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3809 (1971) (public transit
employees); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154c, § 3 (1947) (excluding police and
firefighters), 5154c-1, § 17(a) (1973) (police and firefighters); UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-20-31
(1965) (public transit employees); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-54.1 (1950) (hospital employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.120 (1967); Wis. STAT. § 59.969 (1973) (county
mass tranportation employees); id. § 111.84(e) (1973) (state employees).
'0 A check of statutes in force as of October, 1974, failed to locate relevant legislation in
the following states: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming. According to the general rule enunciated in
Anderson Fed'n. of Teachers v. Anderson City School, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15
(1969). rehearing denied, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329 (1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928
(1970), and cases cited in Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1147 (1971), strikes by public employees
in these states also are illegal.
11
The state statutes so providing, as of Ocotber 1974, were GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1303
(1972); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 15 (1968) (employees subject to discharge
proceedings); MINN. STAT. § 179.07 (1971) (striking employees put on two years' probation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:6 (1969) (strikers subject to court action); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.14 (1971); cf. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154c, §3
(1947) (all public employees except police and firefighters), 5154c-1, § 17(e) (1973) (police
and firefighters placed on probation); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-55 (1950).
12 As of October, 1974, the state statutes so providing were GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1303
(1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (1947) (striking employees penalized concerning
advancement and salary increases); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1, § 17(e)
(19.73) (applicable to police and firefighters).
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ing procedures and giving notice to the government employer of
an intent to strike.1 3 In four of these jurisdictions, courts are
permitted to enjoin walkouts where the government employer can
14
prove that the strike is likely to endanger public health or safety.

In the other two, a court may enjoin the strike or allow it under
certain precautionary conditions. 15 In both the "no-strike"

and

the "limited-strike" jurisdictions, it has been possible to enjoin
walkouts by sanitation, transit, and other employees. 16 Thus, it is
fair to say that legal tools for restricting strikes by government
17
employees exist.

B. The Right of Nonprofit HospitalEmployees
to Strike
As with strikes involving government employees, strikes by
employees of nonprofit hospitals are generally illegal. Since the
18
NLRA expressly excludes these employees from its coverage,
the right to strike or lockout in these institutions is subject to state

law.1 9 In three states, legislation has been enacted forbidding
walkouts by these employees,

20

and on at least one occasion an

anti-strike statute has enabled a local court to enjoin a walkout by
hospital employees.
13

21

As in the case of government employees

ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1962) (excludes certain key employees); HAWAII kEV.
1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§59-1603(1), 59-1614 (Supp.

STAT. § 89-12 (Supp.

1973) (excludes teachers, hospital workers, nurses, and certain other employees); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971) (excludes

police and firefighters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1973) (excludes municipal employees).
14 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1614 (Supp.
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101-1003 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730

(Supp. 1973).
15 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1973).

16 Anti-strike injunctions in the forty-five "no strike" jurisdictions are legion. Many
cases in which they were authorized are collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1131 (1971).
For an example of how an injunction can be issued in a "limited-strike" jurisdiction, see
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority v. T.W.U. Local 234, 77 L.R.R.M. 2489, 66 C.C.H.
Lab. Cas. 52,593 (1971).
17Their effectiveness, of course, depends on the willingness of employees to obey court
injunctions.
18See 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1970).
19 See Amalgamated Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Motor Coach Employees].
20 As of October, 1974, the state statutes so providing were MINN. STAT. § 179.36
(1973);

N.Y. LAB.

LAW §§ 713, 716 (McKinney

1973); WASH.

REV.

CODE

ANN.

§ 49.66.060 (1972). Indiana and Massachusetts, by contrast, allows strikes by nurses in
private hospitals. See Peters v. Poor Sisters of St. Francis, 148 Ind. App. 453, 267 N.E.2d
558 (197 1), trans. denied, 274 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 150A:9 (1970).
21 The injunction, however, was defied. See League of Voluntary Hospitals and Homes
v. Local 1199, Drug & Hosp. Union, 84 L.R.R.M. 2988 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd., 490 F.2d
1398 (T.E.A.C. 1973).
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strikes, however,
22
obeyed.

court

injunctions

have

not always

been

C. The Right of Rail Employees to Strike
The law governing employees of privately owned railways generally allows strikes and lockouts to occur once parties 23 have
exhausted the various negotiating procedures mandated by federal
statute. 24 With the exception of disputes regarding construction
and application of existing contracts and grievances arising thereunder (termed "minor disputes"), 2 5 the law provides no means for
imposing a settlement on the parties. 26 If a dispute comes before
the National Mediation Board, the administrative agency established by Congress to hear railway labor disputes,2 7 either by
submission from one of the parties or at the Board's initiative, a

Id.
23For the remainder of this article, the term "parties" is defined as those persons or
organizations legally responsible for negotiating labor contracts and resolving labor disputes,
i.e., labor unions and management.
24
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1970), imposes on parties the
duty ... to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such
[labor] agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier ....
Courts have generally interpreted this to require a good-faith attempt to negotiate a dispute
as the minimum prerequisite for justifying a strike or lockout. See, e.g., Baker v. UTU,
455 F.2d 149, 154 (3rd Cir. 1971) and cases cited therein. During major disputes (meaning
those "arising out of the formation or change of collective agreements covering rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions," Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
722-27(1945)), parties are also entitled to request mediation and the assistance of the
National Mediation Board [hereinafter' cited as "the Board"]. See 45 U.S.C. § 155, First
(1970); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378
(1968). Alternatively, the Board may volunteer its service if it considers the dispute a
"labor emergency."
If the dispute reaches the Board, the parties are prohibited from striking or locking out
until (1)one or both parties have rejected binding arbitration and (2) in emergency cases,
thirty days have elapsed since the submission of a report prepared by an emergency
fact-finding commission summoned by the President of the United States pursuant to § 10
of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). Otherwise, the parties are free to strike or lock out
following either (1)unsuccessful termination of negotiations or (2) wrongful unilateral
imposition of new work rules. See Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., supra, at 378-79.
21See, e.g., Missouri-Ill., R.R. v. Order of Ry. Conductors and Brakemen, 322 F.2d
793 (8th Cir. 1963); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21
(2nd Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d
881 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961).
26 Compulsory arbitration is available only for settling so-called "minor disputes," i.e.,
disputes relating to the interpretation of existing labor agreements. See Local 429, Brotherhood of R.R. Carmen v. Chicago and N.W. Ry., 354 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1965); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 437 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
22

27 See note 25 supra.
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threatened stoppage can be temporarily enjoined by having the
President, on recommendation of the Board, appoint a fact-finding
commission. 28 Once the commission has reported, however, the
parties are free to reject its recommendations and strike or lockout.

29

D. The Right of Other Private Employees to Strike
The law governing labor relations in the remainder of private
industry generally allows strikes and lockouts to occur wherever
30
the disruption would not amount to an unfair bargaining device.
Employees in these industries have no duty to exhaust certain
bargaining procedures before striking. In addition, they need not
fear the intervention of a federal administrative agency during
their walkout, provided their employer can find no basis on which
to label the strike an unfair labor practice.3 1 For, unlike the
Railway Labor Act, the National Labor Relations Act does not
authorize a federal labor agency to intervene sua sponte in a
dispute.3 2 Rather, the National Labor Relations Board is permitted only to investigate those complaints referred to it by labor,
management, or private citizens;3 3 even then, its jurisdiction is
34
limited to cases involving allegations of "unfair labor practices,"
28

Railway Labor Act,§ 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).

2

Id.

Although federal courts have stated on numerous occasions that the right to strike or
lockout is protected only where both lawful means and a lawful objective are involved,
see, e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1960) and cases cited
therein; in practice, the only requirement is that the shutdown not constitute an unfair
labor practice under Sections 7,8, or 10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 160 (1970).
Cases in which an allegation of unfair labor practices did not appear to trigger an
injunction include NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945) (strike called
to compel employer to violate a wage-stabilization statute); and Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970) ("strike"
involving only a single individual not intending to influence other employees).
3' This is because the jurisdiction of the NLRB is limited, under Section 10 of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), to allegations of unfair labor practices.
32 Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n., 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
33 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964); IUE v. NLRB,
289 F.2d 756, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960). However, any person, "even a stranger," may file
charges of unfair practices against an employer on behalf of one or more employees.
Hercules Powder Co. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 424, 433 (5th Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v.
Local 42, Int'l Ass'n. of Heat & Frost Insulators, 469 F.2d 163 (1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 940 (1973), upholding a Board rule to this effect.
34 See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1970). See also Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93
(1958):
[Tihe Board has no general commission to police collective bargaining agreements and strike down contractual provisions in which there is no element of
an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 108.
30
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a category that does not subsume all disruptions of serious local
consequence.3 5
The LMRA does authorize the President, acting through the
Attorney General, to petition in federal district court for an injunction when a strike or lockout threatens an entire industry (or
a substantial part of it) in interstate commerce and might endanger
the national health or safety.3 6 However, in light of recent court
decisions it appears that this provision will not apply to work
stoppages having only local or regional consequences.3 7 Thus, in
the absence of further federal legislation limiting the right of
employees in NLRA-LMRA industries to strike, it is apparent
that a local-emergency work stoppage in some essential private
industry could not be challenged in court or before any federal
regulatory body. The following section, therefore, analyzes a
number of measures that state or city governments might take to
restrict or halt a shutdown in an essential private industry subject
to the NLRA and LMRA. As will be demonstrated, each has
serious pitfalls that limit its utility in protecting the public from
potential harm.
II. POSSIBLE

MEASURES FOR CONFRONTING SERIOUS

LOCAL WORK STOPPAGES IN PRIVATE INDUSTRIES
SUBJECT TO THE

NLRA-LMRA38

If employees in an essential private enterprise subject to the
National Labor Relations Act (e.g., the local telephone or electric
company) were to strike or threaten to strike, the state or local
government would have several weapons with which to attempt to
avoid the shutdown. The first group of weapons involves direct
action and includes mobilizing the National Guard to seize and
operate the affected enterprise. The second entails suing in court
for an injunction.

35 See, e.g., Motor Coach Employees, supra note 19. Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
410 Pa. 490, 190 A.2d 316 (1963).
36 See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 178
(1970).
37For example, a petition to enjoin a shutdown of nine of Chicago's eleven grain
elevators in 1971 was denied, despite evidence that the strike threatened serious economic
injury. United States v. Local 418, Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n., 335 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.
111.
1971).
3 This section is limited to "NLRA-LMRA disputes" because of the ability of the
National Mediation Board, under Section five of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 155,
First (1970), to intervene voluntarily in emergency rail and airline disputes.
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A. Direct Seizure
The state or municipal government might try to mobilize the
National Guard or state militia to run the affected enterprise for
the duration of the shutdown. This has occasionally been done
during strikes that fall outside NLRB jurisdiction. 39 In several
states, 40 statutes authorize the governor to seize and operate
privately owned utilities during an emergency shutdown, and on
at least one occasion such legislation has been invoked to justify
governmental seizure and operation. 4 1 In the only recent case on
the subject, however, Division 1287, Amalgamated Motor Coach
Employees v. Missouri,4 2 the United States Supreme Court declared one such seizure and the legislation authorizing it invalid as
conflicting with federal law on the subject. 43 Unless the Court is
willing to reverse itself on this point, it is likely that future seizures of this type will also be subject to court challenge and
eventual invalidation. Consequently, the technique of direct seizure cannot be recommended as a device for avoiding crippling
private-sector shutdowns.
B. Petitionfor Injunction
If seizure is unavailable and a request for a "national emergency injunction" under the LMRA is likely to fail because of the
purely local impact of the shutdown, the state or municipality may
try to sue in state court for an anti-strike injunction.4 4 However,
the failure of the NLRA-LMRA to provide any remedy for
serious local work stoppages makes it extremely unlikely that
such a petition could be granted. In response to such a suit any
defendant could raise at least three valid defenses. 45 With the

39 See, e.g., President N'xon's mobilization of federal troops during the 1970 postal
strike, New York Times, March 24, 1970, at 1, col. 8. See also New York Times, March
23, 1970, at 36, col. 6 for an account of other instances in which federal troops were
ordered to replace striking workers.
40 As of October, 1974, the following statutes authorized government seizure of critical
private industries during strikes and lockouts: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13 B- 13 (1947); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 37-01-06 (1960). Missouri's King-Thompson Act, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 295.180 (1959), was declared unconstitutional by the United States in Motor Coach
Employees, supra note 19.
41 See Motor Coach Employees, supra note 19, at 75-76.
4 Id. at 74.
43

Id.

Suit must be brought in state court because federal courts are prohibited by Section 7
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) from enjoining most nonviolent
strikes and lockouts in private industry.
45 See paragraphs 1-3, infra.
44
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exception of a challenge to the government's standing to sue, all
of these defenses pose major obstacles to the granting of meaningful relief.
1. Lack of Jurisdiction (Pre-emption)-The first and most
difficult defense that could be raised is that federal labor law
prevents the court of jurisdiction from hearing the suit. Since
195946 the Supreme Court has required lower courts to decline
jurisdiction over cases "arguably subject to the protections of § 7
' 47
or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act,
on the grounds that Congress has given the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. 4 8 While this
rule (sometimes termed the "pre-emption" rule) has on rare occasions been waived, the Court has stated emphatically that exceptions will be made only in cases of "overriding state interest"
in the subject matter, 4 9 or where
the activity regulated is merely a peripheral concern of the
[NLRA-] Labor Management Relations Act or touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling that, in the absence of
compelling Congressional direction, the Court would not
infer
50
that Congress has deprived [the courts] of power to act.
Thus far, the only exceptions allowed have involved cases alleging on-plant violence or the threat of violence, 5 ' malicious defamation of an employer, 5 2 and failure to process a grievance that
resulted in loss of employment. 5 3 Thus, the critical question is
whether a local-emergency work stoppage is a situation that merits an exception to the pre-emption rule.
One governmental argument, that the state has an "overriding
interest" in preserving order and preventing widespread public
injury, seems destined to lose. On two occasions, the Supreme
Court has rejected this argument in holding that the NLRA prohibited state or federal courts from enjoining work stoppages on
grounds of avoiding public emergency. In the earlier case, Div.
997, Amalgamated Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Em-

46 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
11 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1966) (quoting from Local
100, Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94 (1963)).
48 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
4 Local 100, Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94 (1963).
50 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
51 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
52 Linn v. Local 114, Plant.Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
13 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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ployment Relations Board,54 the Supreme Court cited extensive
legislative history to hold that the NLRA and the supplementary
Taft-Hartley Act were not designed to allow the states to regulate
labor activities in "critical" sectors of private industry. 5 5 In the
second, Div. 1287, Amalgamated Motor Coach Employees v.
Missouri,58 the Court held that the federal labor statutes were
designed to permit such shutdowns notwithstanding their possibility for harm, citing Senator Taft's remark that no exceptions for
utilities should be permitted. 5 7 Unless the present Supreme Court
were to ignore both legislative intent and longstanding precedent,
it would seem unlikely for any state or local government to
persuade a court that state statutes or common law made the
government's interest in avoiding chaos a reason for avoiding the
pre-emption rule.
The only other plausible government argument is that a local
emergency work stoppage, no matter how peaceful its on-site
activity, qualifies as a "violent" stoppage for purposes of avoiding
the pre-emption rule. To date, only one case appears to have
considered the argument; there, the court seemed to reject it by
terming "peaceful" a strike that "cause[d] enormous and irreparable damage to hundreds or thousands of innocent persons who
are not involved in the strike," because no on-site bloodshed
occurred or was threatened. 58 Moreover, it would be bad policy to
blur the definition of "violent" shutdowns to include otherwise
"peaceful" emergency shutdowns. Such a definition would, for
example, contradict the commonly held standard of "violence"
used in applying the Norris-La Guardia Act, 59 thereby introducing tension into the law that another approach to the problem (e.g., the state's interest in maintaining order) would avoid.
For this reason, the approach of classifying emergency work
stoppages as "violent" to circumvent the pre-emption doctrine is

54 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
55 Id. at 389, 391-96.
56 374 U.S. 74 (1963).

57 Senator Taft's remarks, quoted in 374 U.S. 74, 82, n.9, are as follows:
If we begin with public utilities, it will be said that coal and steel are just as
important as public utilities. I do not know where we could draw the line. So
far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the theory that there is a
right to strike and that labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining.
58
Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490,498, 190 A.2d 316, 320 (1963).
59 See, e.g., Local 721, R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (1956);
Heinz Mfg. Co. v. Local'515, UAW, 20 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1937) (employer not
entitled to injunction on ground of assaults and threats occurring outside the plant without
evidence that the union or its officers committed or ratified such acts).
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probably unwise as well as impractical. The problem, however, is
that eliminating this avenue probably also eliminates the government's chance of repulsing the pre-emption defense to its lawsuit.
Unless the government is faced with a shutdown occurring
during the term of the contract (in which case court jurisdiction
exists under § 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act),6 0 it
appears unlikely that the government will overcome the defendants' jurisdictional challenge. Thus, even in the absence of other
objections, it would seem difficult for the government, operating
under present labor laws, to enjoin even a catastrophic work
stoppage in a privately owned corporation.
2. No Standing-In addition to the first defense, a defendant
could challenge the state government's standing to sue. Because
the genuine motivation for the suit is to protect the interests of
local citizens, a defendant might argue that the government has
failed to show the kind of direct injury necessary to justify its
place as plaintiff. This argument, however, would be subject to
rebuttal because of the well-established right of state (and sometimes local) governments to sue in their capacity as parens patriae
for the protection of "quasi-sovereign" state interests. 61
According to many Supreme Court decisions, state governments have standing to sue to enjoin firms and governmental
agencies from acting in ways detrimental to the welfare of the
state as a whole if the state can demonstrate some interest of its
own distinguishable from the interests of private persons within
its borders. 62 In numerous instances the Court has invoked this
rule to allow states to sue out-of-state corporations and government agencies for allegedly polluting air and water within the
boundaries of the plaintiff-state. 63 The Court has also applied the
64
rule to uphold lower-court injunctions against diverting water
and natural gas 6 5 from a state. While the requirement of showing
interests separate from those of individual state residents has
frequently proved troublesome for state governments, 66 it would

60

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).

61 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439,451 (1945).

Id.; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907).
64 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
6 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
6See,
e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); California v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973).
62

63

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 8:173

seem that the government's interest in preserving order would
qualify as a "quasi-sovereign" interest in the case of suits to
enjoin locally-crippling work stoppages. For this reason, the question of standing should pose little problem to a governmental
agency attempting to halt or avoid a local emergency strike or
67
lockout.
3. Lack of Power to Issue Injunctions-If no other defense
succeeds, a defendant should nonetheless have a winning argument in the inability of courts to enjoin walkouts accompanied by
peaceful picketing. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,68 federal
courts are expressly forbidden to issue injunctions against strikes
or lockouts in private industry where no threat of violence can be
established. 69 In many states, comparable statutes similarly restrict the power of state courts to enjoin peaceful shutdowns and
walkouts. 70 In the absence of a decision that the threat to public
health and safety from disruptions in essential services constitutes
"violence" within the meaning of these statutes, it would be most
unlikely for any court, state or federal, to issue an injunction
against the kind of work stoppage being discussed. Thus, it is
altogether possible that a governmental unit, though able to challenge a severe shutdown in court, wQuld be unable to obtain
meaningful relief even if it could show the direst consequences
flowing from such a strike or lockout.
67 Presumably the government would also have little difficultly asserting standing if,
as is
possible, it were to sue in defense of its interest in maintaining government functions.
68 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
69 Although Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970), speaks in terms of "unlawful
acts," courts have consistently construed these words to mean "violence, breaches of the
peace, and criminal acts." See Local 72 1, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956); Wilson & Co. v. BirI, 105 F.2d 948, 952 (3rd Cir.
1939); see generally,Note, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960).
70As of this writing, the state statutes prohibiting state courts from enjoining peaceful

strike included ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (1956): COLO.

REV. STAT.

ANN

§ 80-4-16 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§31-115, 31-116 (1968); 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1970)(Norris-LaGuardia Act-District of Columbia); HAWAII REV. STAT. §380-4
(1963);

IDAHO CODE § 44-703 (1948);

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (Smith-Hurd 1971)

(See Precision Scientific Co. v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, 2
Ill. App. 2d 531, 120 N.E.2d 356 (1954)); IND. CODE § 22-6-1(4) (1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-904 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 68 (1957) (enjoinable only when peace
officers cannot furnish protection); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 9A(i-4) (1950)
(enjoinable only when peace officers cannot furnish protection); MINN. STAT. 3§ 185.10,
185.11 (1971); N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:15-51 (1937); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 807(1) (1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-05 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 166 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 662.050-662.070 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206f (1937); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-10-2 (1968) (enjoinable only when peace officers cannot furnish protection); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-19-2 Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.32.050(Supp. 1939);
WIS. STAT. §§ 103.53, 133.07-133.08 (1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-241 (1967).
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It appears that federal labor law, by protecting private-sector
labor relations from unwanted governmental interference, has also
enabled employers and employees in a handful of industries. to
paralyze a community if an impasse in negotiations convinces
either party that a work stoppage would strengthen its bargaining
position. If the decision in Motor Coach Employees is any guide,
state action alone will be unable to close this potentially dangerous loophold in the law. Rather, Congress must decide to
amend the existing federal labor statutes if the nightmare of
strikes by members of essential private industries is to be avoided.

I1.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

If locally crippling, private-sector work stoppages are to be
avoided, American labor law must recognize that certain private-sector strikes and lockouts, while not endangering national
health and safety, may nevertheless threaten public welfare
sufficiently to warrant similar restriction. This requires new
legislation that recognizes the unique ability of certain local
shutdowns within the NLRA-LMRA jurisdiction to endanger
public health and safety and provides special remedies for minimizing the consequences of such shutdowns or for avoiding them
altogether. This section considers the justification for such legislation in light of the present public-private dichotomy within American labor law. It also suggests ways in which the public's interest
in avoiding disruption can be served without eliminating this duality. Finally, the section discusses briefly the merits of three devices for avoiding disruption: the temporary injunction, the permanent injunction, and the mandatory injunction that allows a
partial rather than total strike or lockout.
A. The Place of Restrictions againstPrivate-Sector
Shutdowns within the Bifurcated Structure ofAmerican Law
As has been suggested elsewhere in this article, American labor
law has been molded in great part by concern over avoiding
strikes by public employees. While legislators during the past four
decades have been receptive to the need of private employees to
strike and organize, fear of enabling government workers to "hold
the public for ransom" or to "overturn carefully wrought budgetary decisions normally delegated to the legislature" 71 have pre71 Two court pronouncements to this effect appear in Anderson, Strikes and Impasse
Resolution in Public Emplyment, 67 MicH. L. REV. 943, 959 (1969).
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vented passage of humane labor statutes for governmental employees until very recently. 72 The result has been a dual system of
labor law for public and private workplaces: the former law emphasizing a duty to serve the public; the latter recognizing no such
duty. 73 While the differing right to strike in the two systems has
recently come under serious attack,74 the belief that private parties, unlike governmental organizations and employees, bear no
general duty to provide service remains unchallenged. 75 So long
as this dichotomy remains popular, it is important to demonstrate
that the legislation proposed in this article would not seriously
alter the dual system of labor law currently operating in the
76
United States.
While it is true that any restriction upon the right of certain
private parties to strike or lockout would modify existing labor
law, it is important to realize that such a change would not
represent a radical departure from well-accepted labor policy in
this country. For fifty years American law has recognized the
duty of rail employers and employees to subordinate their right to
disrupt operations during bargaining to the public's need for essential transportation service, a duty set forth in Sections 3, 5, and
10 of the Railway Labor Act. 77 Since 1948, Congress has imposed a similar obligation upon parties in other private industries
whose disruption would seriously endanger national health and
safety. 78 While the duties imposed by these statutes are not so

restrictive as those in.osed upon public employers and employees, their very existence reflects the feeling that public interests
cannot be ignored while the freedom of private parties to strike
72 Most state public employment relations statutes date from the mid- 1960's. See notes
9-1I supra.
73 See part I supra.
74 See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees,
79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970). Contra, H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND
CITIES (1971); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). Other relevant articles include Anderson, supra
note 71, and Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10
L. REV. 357 (1972).
DUQUESNE
75
See Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 190 A.2d 316 (1963) for an
especially forcible statement of the effect in the private sector.
[A] peaceful strike, like peaceful picketing, conducted in a lawful manner and
for a lawful purpose is lawful even though it shuts down, bankrupts, or puts
out of business a company or firm which is struck and even though it also
causes enormous and irreparable damage to hundreds or thousands of persons who are not involved in the strike.
190 A.2d at 320.
76 Even Burton & Krider, supra note 74, do not reverse their argument to suggest that
private parties have a duty to provide service.
77 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 155, 160 (1970).
78 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-181 (1970).
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and lockout is protected. Extending the class of affected industries
to include locally essential activities would thus be at most an
extension, rather than a revision, of existing policy. If the statute
were drafted to define essential industries not by name but by the
likelihood that their disruption would seriously endanger public
health and safety, as is done in the present statutes which regulate
national-emergency labor disputes and strikes by state and municipal employees; if government officials were required to post a
substantial bond before suing to enjoin a threatened or existing
work stoppage; and if the available remedy were limited to a
temporary injunction or a mandatory order that basic services be
maintained during the shutdown; the proposed legislation would
limit only modestly the freedom of private employees and employers to use "concerted action" in support of their bargaining positions. By including suitable restraints upon government interference in work stoppages, such legislation would not fundamentally alter the existing dichotomy between private- and public-sector labor law. Rather, it would eliminate the worst features
of the system while perpetuating the underlying notion that private-sector work stoppages, unlike those in the public sector,
generally promote the public's interest by making viable employment agreements possible.
B. The Choice of Remedies
While this article is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of
specific legislative proposals, there are several proposals which,
though previously advocated as reforms of the existing national-emergency dispute resolution procedures, could also serve as
means for insulating the public from local-emergency work stoppages. 79 It has already been suggested that proposals entailing
some form of compulsory arbitration violate the accepted policy
of allowing private-sector parties some freedom to disrupt operations during even the most severe labor disputes. A second
reason for rejecting such proposals is the danger that their enactment will weaken the incentives for parties to compromise their
demands during bargaining. 0 According to many experts, the
tendency of arbitrators to "split the difference" encourages parties
79 For discussion of proposals, see Crossland, Public Interest Disputes: An Economic

and Legal Analysis Beyond the Pale of Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act, 12 WAYNE L.
REV. 780 (1966); Lewis, Proposals for Change in the Taft-Hartley Emergency Procedures: A Critical Appraisal, 40 TENN. L. REV. 689; and Note, National Emergency
Disputes in the Transportation Industry: An Analysis of Final Offer Selection as a
Solution to the Problem, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 101 (1973).
"oSee generally Lewis, supra note 80.
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to stick to their initial demands in the hope of presenting the
strongest possible position to the arbitrators.8 1 The result is to
make meaningful negotiations far less likely than would be the
case if only mediation, fact-finding, or the prospect of a temporary
injunction existed. In light of both arguments, it makes little sense
to recommend a proposal requiring binding arbitration.
Of the remaining proposals for reform, the two that seem most
promising are the temporary anti-stoppage injunction (sometimes
termed the "cooling-off" injunction) and the "limited-strike" order. The former, which is the backbone of the present federal
restrictions on private-sector emergency stoppages, retains widespread popularity despite its failure to prevent strikes and lockouts from occurring in several critical industries. 8 2 To at least one
scholar this approach, combined with substantial fact-finding and
mediation services, presents the optimal means for avoiding
serious disruption in essential industry.83 The second remedy,
which would enable a court to permit shutdown on condition that
certain basic services are maintained, is a promising idea that has
yet to enjoy widespread acceptance. It appears that this remedy
offers the greatest opportunity for simultaneously preserving the
public's interest in maintaining service while allowing bargaining
parties their freedom to support bargaining positions through
"concerted action." Hopefully, it will not be ignored during any
discussion of remedies for locally-crippling private shutdowns.
IV. CONCLUSION

This 'article has attempted to show the consequences of American labor law's failure to account for a dangerous and not altogether unlikely contingency. It has demonstrated the inability of
private citizens or their elected officials to prevent a handful of
strong-willed individuals from paralyzing their communities and
metropolitan areas and injuring many people by their failure to
resolve disagreements. What remains now is for Congress to
redefine the extent to which private employees and employers
may endanger public welfare by striking or locking out. If Congress acts thoughtfully, the resulting legislation can significantly
increase public protection without seriously limiting the right of
private parties to engage in free and vigorous bargaining.
-Joshua Greene
81Id. at 692.
82

Note. supra note 80, at 105-07.

83

See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV.

459 (1971). Hawaii has a statute granting state courts the power to sanction "limited
strikes" by public employees. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971).

